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Abstract 
 
Protection in terms of labour law is primarily available only to 
persons with status as employees. In South Africa the courts 
have over the years developed different tests to establish who is 
an employee and therefore entitled to the protection afforded by 
labour law. These tests have been incorporated into legislation. 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for a definition 
and presumption of who is an employee. The Act also excludes 
certain categories of persons from its application and ambit. 
Although magistrates have not expressly been excluded from 
the application of the Act, it has been held that they are not 
employees, because such a categorisation would infringe the 
principle of judicial independence as guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The purpose 
of this contribution is to evaluate whether magistrates could be 
categorised as employees in terms of the traditional tests of 
employment and still be able to maintain judicial independence 
as required by the South African Constitution. 
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1 Introduction 
A person's employment status is relevant for a number of reasons. The main 
reason is that protection in terms of labour law is primarily available only to 
employees.1 Such protection includes a number of rights.2 For example, 
employees have the right not to be unfairly dismissed and not to be 
subjected to unfair labour practices.3 Employees are also afforded extensive 
collective bargaining rights4 and they are protected in that their contracts of 
employment may not go beyond certain minimum conditions of 
employment.5 Furthermore, certain common-law remedies are available 
only when there is an employer-employee relationship. For example, when 
an employee commits a delict in the performance of his or her duties, the 
injured party may institute a claim against the employer on the basis of the 
doctrine of vicarious liability.6 
It is also of great importance for an employer to determine whether someone 
is an employee, as an employment relationship creates certain duties for 
the employer. For example, an employer is obliged to deduct tax from the 
remuneration paid to an employee.7 An employer is also in certain 
circumstances obliged to make deductions from such remuneration for the 
purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Fund.8 
                                            
*  Leana Diedericks. LLB (Stell), LLM (Stell), LLM (Pret). Lecturer, Department of 
Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria. E-mail: leana.diedericks@up.ac.za. Certain 
portions of this article are an abridged version of a dissertation, entitled "The Status 
of Magistrates as Employees in South-Africa", submitted by the author in fulfilment 
of the LLM degree at the University of Pretoria. 
1  Brassey 1990 ILJ 890. Also see Khanyile v CCMA 2004 ILJ 2348 (LC) (hereafter 
Khanyile), where the court confirmed that it is necessary for the applicant to show 
that he is an employee before he is entitled to rely on remedies in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter "LRA").  
2  See Diedericks and Van Eck 2015 THRHR 476 for a brief discussion of the rights of 
employees. 
3  Section 185 of the LRA provides that every employee has the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed and not to be subjected to unfair labour practice. 
4  See ch II of the LRA for the general protection afforded to employees regarding 
collective bargaining. 
5  Section 2 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (hereafter "BCEA") 
sets out the establishment and enforcement of basic conditions of employment as 
one of the purposes of the said Act. 
6  Du Bois Wille's Principles 1216; Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles 69. 
7  The rules regarding the deduction of employees' tax are set out in para 2 of the 
Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
8  In terms of ch 2 of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4 of 2002 an 
employer is obliged to deduct 1% from the remuneration paid or payable to an 
employee as a contribution to the unemployment insurance fund. The employer is 
then obliged to pay that deduction over to the Commissioner of Revenue Services 
or the Unemployment Insurance Commissioner. 
L DIEDERICKS  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  3 
Therefore the first step to determine whether a person is entitled to 
protection in terms of labour law and whether an employer has certain 
legislative duties is to establish if that person is an employee. 
In the case of Khanyile9 the question arose whether a magistrate as a 
member of the judiciary is an employee and therefore entitled to rely on the 
protection afforded by labour legislation. In that case a magistrate had been 
denied promotion to the status of senior magistrate and as a result filed an 
unfair labour practice dispute under the auspices of the LRA10 against the 
Minister of Justice, whom the magistrate regarded as his employer. The 
court held that at face value it would seem that a magistrate could be 
categorised as an employee, taking into consideration the definition of an 
"employee" in terms of the LRA11 and the fact that magistrates are not 
explicitly excluded from the ambit of this Act.12 However, the court noted 
that the statutory definition of an employee should be construed within a 
broader constitutional framework.13 The court took the enquiry of the 
employment status of a magistrate beyond the traditional tests for the 
existence of employment or an employment relationship. It was held that a 
judicial officer cannot be an employee, in view of the fact that the South 
African Constitution14 provides that the courts are independent and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law.15 The Constitution requires the judiciary 
to apply the law and Constitution without interference from any person or 
organ of state.16 Accordingly the court refused to bring magistrates within 
the protective measures of the LRA and found that the constitutional 
guarantee of an independent judiciary would be compromised if judicial 
officers were to be categorised as employees. The court concluded that it 
would be difficult to reconcile an employment relationship between a 
magistrate and the state (as the employer) with judicial independence. It 
was clear to the court that an employment relationship between a magistrate 
                                            
9  See Brassey 1990 ILJ 890 and Khanyile. 
10  Section 186(2) of the LRA prohibits unfair conduct by the employer relating inter alia 
to promotion. 
11  Section 213 of the LRA defines an employee as a) "any person, excluding an 
independent contractor, who works for another person or the State and who receives 
or is entitled to receive any remuneration; and b) any person who in any manner 
assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer". 
12  Khanyile para 10. S 2 of the LRA expressly excludes members of the National 
Defence Force and the State Security Agency from its scope and application. 
13  Khanyile para 10. 
14  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the "Constitution"). 
15  Khanyile para 30. 
16  Section 165 of the Constitution. 
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and the state and the maintenance of an independent judiciary cannot co-
exist.17 
The purpose of this article is to investigate whether the need to preserve 
judicial independence is a valid reason for excluding magistrates from being 
categorised as employees. The investigation commences with a discussion 
of the traditional tests for employment. This discussion is aimed at 
establishing whether magistrates could indeed qualify as employees in 
terms of the traditional tests. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
core of the concept of judicial independence, with the aim of determining 
whether the classification of magistrates as employees would give the state 
the authority to interfere in the judicial functions of magistrates and thereby 
infringe the principle of judicial independence. Finally, the article provides a 
brief overview of the labour rights of members of the judiciary in England, 
for the purpose of illustrating that judicial independence and employment 
are not mutually exclusive. 
2 Traditional tests to establish employment 
2.1 Common law tests 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Traditionally the existence of a contract of employment served as the 
foundation for an employer-employee relationship.18 Three main tests have 
been applied by the courts to identify a contract of employment, namely the 
control test, the organisation test and the dominant impression test.19 These 
tests distinguish between an employee and an independent contractor. If a 
person is an independent contractor, no employment relationship exists and 
generally the rights and duties applicable to an employment relationship 
would not apply. 
The control test entails that when a principal has the right to supervise and 
control the work to be done, the relationship between the parties would be 
one of employment.20 The application of this test entails that the greater the 
degree of control and supervision the employer is entitled to exercise, the 
                                            
17  Khanyile para 31. 
18  Department of Health, Eastern Cape v Odendaal 2009 30 ILJ 2093 (LC) 2111G; 
Radley and Smit 2010 Obiter 250; Nkosi 2015 De Jure 239. 
19  Cole Management Theory and Practice 408. 
20  Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald 1931 AD 412 435. Also 
see Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A) 53D 
(hereafter Smit); SABC v McKenzie 1999 20 ILJ (LAC) 589D-E (hereafter Mckenzie); 
R v AMCA Services Ltd 1959 4 SA 207 (A) 212H. 
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greater the probability would be that a contract of employment exists.21 The 
courts began to acknowledge that although the presence of the right to 
supervision and control is an important factor in determining the existence 
of a contract of employment, it is not the only factor, but merely one of a 
number of factors.22 
In accordance with the organisation test, the existence of a contract of 
employment depends on whether or not the person performing the work is 
part of the organisation.23 The organisation test was rejected by the courts 
as it is regarded as too vague and fails to provide clarity on the nature and 
extent of the integration into the organisation.24 
The dominant impression test is the salient test to establish the existence 
of a contract of employment.25 This test was first introduced by the court in 
Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap AVBOB26 
and then reinforced in the case of Smit.27 The dominant impression test 
entails the weighing-up of a number of factors against one another, and the 
dominant impression gained after the weighing exercise is determinative of 
the type of contract, for example a contract of employment. The factors 
taken into account are not exhaustive and the courts have held that there is 
no single factor that is decisive in determining the existence of a contract of 
employment.28 
2.1.2 The dominant impression test 
The courts have continued to apply the dominant impression test. In the 
case of McKenzie29 the court identified some of the important characteristics 
of a contract in order to distinguish between an employee and an 
independent contractor. The court found that if the object of the contract 
was for the performance of specified work or a specified result, it would be 
an indication that the person is an independent contractor. If the person 
                                            
21  Mandla v LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd 2000 21 ILJ 1807 (LC) 1809C-E. 
22  Stein v Rising Tide Productions (CC) 2002 23 ILJ 2017 (C) 2018D-E; Smit 53E. This 
acknowledgement by the courts led to the formulation of the dominant impression 
test, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
23  Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart NV v Slatford 1952 2 All ER 956 (CA) 971. Also 
see Smit 63D; McKenzie 589E. 
24  R v AMCA Services Ltd 1962 4 SA 537 (A) 540H; Smit 63D-E.  
25  Olivier 2008 TSAR 3. 
26  Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap AVBOB 1976 4 SA 
446 (A) 457A. 
27  Smit 53D. 
28  Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald 1931 AD 412 435. Also 
see Smit 53D; McKenzie 1589D-E; R v AMCA Services Ltd 1959 4 SA 207 (A) 212H. 
29  McKenzie 1589D-E. 
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rendering the service was subject to the supervision and control of the 
employer or was obliged to render the service personally, it would be 
indicative of an employment contract. The court further considered when 
the relevant contract would terminate. If it terminated on the death of the 
person rendering the service, that would be an indication that the person 
was an employee.30 
Almost a decade after McKenzie, in State Information Technology Agency 
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA,31 the court reduced the criteria used to determine 
whether a contract of employment exists. The court identified three main 
criteria, namely: 
(a) the principal's right to supervision and control; 
(b) the extent to which the person forms an integral part of the 
organisation of the principal; and 
(c) the extent to which the person is economically dependent on the 
employer.32 
The first two criteria are a combination of the control and organisational tests 
as discussed above. The court, however, introduced an additional criterion, 
namely the degree of economic dependence on the employer of the person 
performing the work.  
2.1.2.1 Application of the dominant impression test to the position of 
magistrates 
If one were to apply the above three criteria to the position of magistrates, 
the latter two criteria – at least on the face of it – would be satisfied. In my 
view magistrates do indeed form an integral part of the organisation of the 
principal, in the sense that they have their chambers at court and they 
perform their duties at court on a daily basis. Magistrates would also pass 
the criterion of economic dependence. With regards to "economic 
dependence", Benjamin33 states the following: 
Economic dependence relates to the entrepreneurial position of the person in 
the marketplace. An important indicator that a person is not dependent 
                                            
30  See McKenzie 590F-591D for the listed differences between an employee and an 
independent contractor.  
31  State Information Technology Agency (SITA) (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2008 7 BLLR 611 
(LAC) (hereafter SITA). 
32  SITA para 12. 
33  Benjamin 2004 ILJ 787. 
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economically is that he or she is entitled to offer skills or services to persons 
other than his or her employer ... [D]epending upon an employer for the supply 
of work is a significant indicator of economic dependence.34 
It is submitted that magistrates are not in a position to offer their skills to 
various principals, because they are expected to be readily available to 
perform services should their head of office require them to do so. In terms 
of section 36 of the Magistrates Act,35 magistrates may be required to 
perform official service at any day of the week or any time of the day or night 
and to be present at their normal working place or elsewhere to perform the 
said service. It is important that magistrates should be remunerated 
adequately and thus placed in a position whereby it will not be necessary 
for them to engage in other activities in order to supplement their salaries. 
If there is no economic dependence and security, their ability to act 
independently may be jeopardised.36 They may, for example, be tempted to 
become involved in corruption by accepting bribes to reach certain verdicts 
in particular matters in which they preside. 
The criterion of control and supervision has, however, been a contentious 
one. It is argued that should a judicial officer be categorised as an employee, 
the state will have control over the magistracy and thus be permitted to 
influence the outcome of a decision, which will result in judicial 
independence being compromised.37 At first glance this seems to be a valid 
argument, but the issue requires further analysis, which will take place 
below. 
However, even if it is accepted for argument's sake that magistrates can 
never be subject to supervision and control, an employment relationship 
could still be present with reference to the other criteria used to establish an 
employment relationship. This is so because all the criteria need not 
necessarily be complied with.38 What is conclusive is the dominant 
impression that is gained from the weighing-up of all of them. 
                                            
34  Benjamin 2004 ILJ 803. Also see Pam Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus 2010 
31 ILJ 1460 (LC) 1468E-H (hereafter Pam Golding Properties). 
35  Magistrates Act 90 of 1993. 
36  Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa v President of RSA 2013 7 
BCLR 762 (CC) para 43. 
37  Wallis 2012 SALJ 653-654; LDM Du Plessis obo L Pretorius v Department of Justice 
(unreported) award number GA 26670 considered by Commissioner PJ van der 
Merwe of 17 December 2002 (hereafter LDM Du Plessis). Also see Khanyile. 
38  SITA 803.  
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2.2 Statutory test 
2.2.1 Employee defined 
As already stated, the LRA provides for a definition to establish who is an 
employee.39 In order to analyse the definition, it is worth quoting it in this 
section as well. Section 213 of the LRA defines an employee as: 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for 
another person or the State and who receives or is entitled to receive 
any remuneration; and  
(b)  any person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting 
the business of an employer. 
In terms of subsection (a) of the definition, an independent contractor is 
expressly excluded. However, subsection (b) is wide enough to include an 
independent contractor. For example, it could be argued that an 
independent plumber assists in carrying on the business of a hair salon by 
repairing the blocked taps in the salon. However, while subparagraph (b) is 
open to wide interpretation, the courts have tended to interpret it 
conservatively so as to not include an independent contractor.40  
Irrespective of the statutory definition of an employee, the courts have 
continued to apply the common-law dominant impression test.41 The factors 
developed by the courts are therefore still relevant to assisting the courts to 
establish who is an employee. The factors as listed in the Smit case have 
been codified in the Code of Good Practice: Who is An Employee.42 
Although these factors are still influential in determining who is an 
employee, less emphasis is being placed on the existence of a contract of 
employment. Now the focus has shifted to the existence of an employment 
relationship as the basis for protection in terms of labour law.43 For example, 
in Kylie v CCMA44 the Labour Appeal Court provided labour law protection 
to a sex worker even in the absence of a valid contract of employment. The 
court found that the criminalisation of sex work does not necessarily deny a 
                                            
39  Section 213 of the LRA. 
40  Casale Employment Relationship 9. Also see Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v 
Niselow 1996 17 ILJ 673 (LAC) 683A-D, where the court acknowledged that the 
latter part of the definition may extend beyond its common meaning. The court, 
however, held that a literal interpretation of the provision would result in absurdity. 
41  Pam Golding Properties 1467C-J. Also see Stein v Rising Tide Productions CC 2002 
23 ILJ 2017 (C), where the court applied this test irrespective of s 213 of the LRA; 
Casale Employment Relationship 11. 
42  GN 1774 in GG 29445 of 1 December 2006 (hereafter "Code of Good Practice"). 
43  Van Niekerk et al Law@work 59. 
44  Kylie v CCMA 2010 31 ILJ 1600 (LAC). 
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sex worker protection in terms of the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices. It was further held that within the broader constitutional right to 
fair labour practices, the LRA protects employees by ensuring that 
employers adhere to and give effect to these rights within the context of an 
employment relationship.45 
The case of Discovery Health v CCMA46 is a further example of where the 
court did not focus on the contract of employment as the sole basis upon 
which to establish protection in terms of labour law. In that case an illegal 
immigrant without a valid work permit was granted labour law protection. In 
this regard the court found that the definition of an employee in terms of 
section 213 of the LRA is not dependent on the existence of a valid contract 
of employment.47 
The legislature has also now broadened the scope of the application of 
labour law with the recent amendments to the LRA.48 In this regard the 
definition of a dismissal49 has now been amended to mean a termination of 
employment.50 Prior to the amendment, dismissal in terms of the relevant 
provision meant a termination of the contract of employment by the 
employer. Now, the termination of an employment relationship rather than 
an employment contract satisfies the requirements of the term "dismissal". 
If one takes cognisance of the courts' and legislature's understanding that 
the contract of employment is not the sole basis for offering protection in 
terms of labour law, it can be argued that the employment status of 
magistrates, and ultimately their entitlement to labour rights, can be 
established without necessarily having to prove the existence of a contract 
of employment. What should be proved, instead, to establish that 
magistrates are entitled to labour law protection, is the existence of an 
employment relationship. 
Section 200A of the LRA now contains a presumption of employment. This 
presumption strengthens the notion that the contract of employment is not 
the only basis for establishing labour law protection.51 
                                            
45  Kylie v CCMA 2010 31 ILJ 1600 (LAC) paras 39, 40 and 54. 
46  Discovery Health v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1480 (LC). 
47  Discovery Health v CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1480 (LC) paras 49 and 54. 
48  The LRA was amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014. 
49  Section 186(1) of the LRA provides for a definition of dismissal and lists various 
situations which would constitute a dismissal. 
50  Emphasis added; see s 186(1)(a) of the LRA. 
51  Le Roux 2007 SALJ 470.  
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2.2.2 Presumption of employment 
In 2002 the legislature introduced a rebuttable presumption in the LRA to 
establish who is an employee.52 The introduction was in response to the 
practice of disguised employment, whereby employers attempted to avoid 
the provisions of the labour statutes by contracting the work to be done to 
independent contractors.53 It is clearly stipulated that the presumption 
applies irrespective of the form of the contract between the parties. 
It is worth noting that the presumption does not alter the statutory definition 
of "employee". All it means is that if the presumption applies, it shifts the 
onus onto the employer to prove that the alleged employee is not an 
employee. Failure to satisfy the burden of proof on the part of the employer 
will result in the person in question’s being deemed to be an employee.54 
In terms of the presumption, a person who works for or renders services to 
another person is presumed to be an employee if at least one of seven listed 
factors is present. The factors listed are as follows:  
(a) whether the person is subject to the control or direction of another 
person;  
(b) whether the person's working hours are subject to the control or 
direction of another person;  
(c) whether the person forms part of the relevant organisation;  
(d) whether the person has worked an average of 40 hours per month 
over the last three months;  
(e) whether the person is economically dependent on another person;  
(f) whether the person makes use of the tools or trade or work 
equipment of another person; and  
(g) whether the person works for or renders service to only one person.55 
                                            
52  Section 83A of the BCEA contains a similar presumption of employment for the 
purposes of that Act.  
53  Casale Employment Relationship 16. 
54  Van Niekerk et al Law@work 64. 
55  The seven factors are listed in s 200A(1) of the LRA. 
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The presumption operates only if the person alleging to be an employee 
earns below a certain threshold amount56 and will certainly not be applicable 
to magistrates, because magistrates earn in excess of the threshold 
amount.57 As already stated, it is important that magistrates receive 
adequate remuneration as it is an important aspect of judicial 
independence. If they lacked such security that might lead them not to act 
independently.58 However, the Labour Appeal Court has held that where the 
presumption is not applicable as a result of a person’s earning above the 
threshold, the listed factors may still be applied in order to provide guidance 
towards establishing whether an employment relationship exists.59 
In terms of section 200A(4) of the LRA, NEDLAC60 was required to prepare 
and issue a Code of Good Practice setting out guidelines to determine 
whether persons, including those who earn in excess of the threshold 
amount, are employees. NEDLAC complied with this provision and 
developed and issued the required Code of Good Practice. This Code 
incorporated the approach in the Denel case and provides that the factors 
listed in the presumption may be used as guidelines to determine whether 
or not an employment relationship exists. 
2.2.2.1 Application of the presumption of employment to the position of 
magistrates 
In the light of the above, even though the presumption does not apply to 
magistrates, the latter six of the factors in terms of the presumption listed 
above would be satisfied in the case of magistrates. A magistrate's working 
hours are set out in regulation 35 of the Magistrates Act, which states that 
a magistrate's office hours will be from 07:45 to 16:15 on Mondays to 
Fridays with a lunch interval of not more than 45 minutes. Also, in terms of 
regulation 37, a magistrate may not be absent from his or her place of duty 
during office hours without the consent of the head of office. 
                                            
56  The threshold amount is currently R205 433.30. It is determined from time to time by 
the Minister of Labour in terms of s 6(3) of the BCEA. 
57  In 2016 a magistrate earned R835 444 per annum in terms of a proclamation by the 
President in GN 327 in GG 38568 of 17 March 2016. Higher scales apply in respect 
of different categories of magistrates - a senior and a regional magistrate earn more 
than a magistrate, for example. In terms of the proclamation any reference to 
"magistrate" refers to all ranks of magistrates appointed on a permanent basis. 
58  See Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa v President of RSA 2013 
7 BCLR 762 (CC) para 43. 
59  Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 2005 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC) (hereafter Denel). 
60  In terms of s 213 of the LRA, NEDLAC means the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council established by s 2 of the National Economic, Development and 
Labour Council Act 35 of 1994.  
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These regulations are firstly an indication that the working hours of 
magistrates are subject to the control or direction of another person. 
Regulation 35 requires that magistrates work an average of 40 hours per 
month over a period of three months. In this regard they would satisfy the 
factor as listed under paragraph (d) above. Furthermore, magistrates would 
also be regarded as satisfying the requirement that they form part of the 
relevant organisation. This is borne out by the amount of time they are 
required to be at work. As noted above, magistrates are expected to be at 
work from Monday to Friday, in other words five days a week. Also, as stated 
above, magistrates are economically dependent on their remuneration and 
do not render services to different organisations.61 
Finally, magistrates are provided with tools or work equipment. For 
example, they are required to use a cloak when they preside over matters 
and are provided with chambers at court and all the facilities that enable 
them to exercise their duties. 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that magistrates comply with at least 
six of the seven listed factors, only one of which – any one - must be present 
in order for the presumption of employment to take effect. It is only the first 
factor, namely, supervision and control, which may not be satisfied 
conclusively at this stage. However, as stated above, an analysis of that 
factor will be conducted in the subsequent discussion. 
3 Judicial independence and employment 
3.1 Introduction 
The exclusion of magistrates from employment status has been justified by 
the fact that the Constitution requires that the judiciary be independent.62 In 
Van Rooyen v The State,63 the Constitutional Court noted that magistrates 
are not entitled to engage in collective bargaining due to their judicial 
independence.64 The CCMA in the case of LDM Du Plessis followed a 
similar approach when it held that a magistrate who referred to it an unfair 
labour practice dispute was not an employee and therefore not entitled to 
                                            
61  Magistrates Act 90 of 1993; Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa 
v President of RSA 2013 7 BCLR 762 (CC) para 43. 
62  Section 165 of the Constitution. 
63  Van Rooyen v The State 2002 5 SA 246 (CC) para 139 (hereafter Van Rooyen). 
64  It is argued that the court did not give a conclusive judgment on this issue. The 
central focus of the case was the extent of the independence of the magistracy and 
this obiter statement was the only instance in the entire case where the court 
remarked on the status of magistrates as employees. In this regard see Van Eck and 
Diedericks 2014 ILJ 2707. 
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rely on the dispute resolution mechanisms established by the LRA. The 
CCMA relied on the reference made in Van Rooyen regarding the issue of 
the employment status of magistrates. 
In Khanyile the Labour Court in no uncertain terms held that magistrates 
cannot have the status of employees due to the fact that the Constitution 
requires the judiciary to be independent.65 This decision established a clear 
precedent in the matter. 
In 2010 the issue of the employment status of magistrates again arose in 
the matter of Reinecke v The President of South Africa,66 where a 
magistrate claimed that the chief magistrate had repudiated the contract of 
employment between the parties by making his (the magistrate's) continued 
employment intolerable. Although the High Court took cognisance of the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices, it remarked that the LRA was not 
directly applicable to a judicial officer.67 The court concluded, however, that 
a contract of employment existed between the parties, and awarded a 
substantial amount of damages to the aggrieved magistrate for breach of 
contract. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal68 left open the question 
whether a magistrate is entitled to protection under the LRA. However, the 
court remarked on the issue of judicial independence and stated that it is 
not a valid justification for excluding magistrates from labour law protection. 
In this regard the court stated: 
Nothing in the judgment affects the constitutional position of magistrates as 
part of the judiciary and the judicial authority in this country in terms of chapter 
8 of the Constitution. The narrow question is simply whether ... magistrates 
were employees of the State in terms of contracts of employment ... A finding 
that they were so employed does not impact upon their independence, which 
is constitutionally guaranteed.69 
The above quotation raises the question whether the Reinecke case 
overturned the precedent set by Khanyile, namely that magistrates cannot 
be employees due to the fact that the Constitution guarantees judicial 
independence. In this regard the difference between the ratio decidendi and 
the obiter dicta of a case becomes relevant. The ratio decidendi sets a 
                                            
65  Khanyile para 30. 
66  Reinecke v The President of South Africa (unreported) case number 25705/2004 of 
4 September 2012. 
67  Reinecke v The President of South Africa (unreported) case number 25705/2004 of 
4 September 2012 para 45; also see Van Eck and Diedericks 2014 ILJ 2708, where 
the authors argue that the High Court was misdirected in that finding. 
68  President of SA v Reinecke 2014 3 SA 205 (SCA) (hereafter Reinecke); for a detailed 
discussion of the case see Van Eck and Diedericks 2014 ILJ 2700. 
69  Reinecke para 7.  
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precedent and consists of the legal principles upon which the court based 
its decision, while obiter dicta are mere remarks which the court makes in 
passing and do not set any precedent.70 
If the above statement formed part of the ratio decidendi, it overturned the 
Khanyile decision on the basis of stare decisis.71 
In my view, the court's statement relating to judicial independence and 
employment was made in passing and therefore formed part of the obiter 
dicta of the judgement. This is so, because it was never argued before the 
court that judicial independence was a basis for excluding magistrates from 
employment status. The statement made by the court was also the only 
reference to the co-existence of employment and judicial independence in 
the entire case. Therefore it is submitted that the principle set in Khanyile 
prevails, that judicial independence and employment are mutually 
exclusive. 
However, if one were to assume, for argument's sake, that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal indeed overruled the principle set by Khanyile, it is still 
important to analyse the view that judicial independence and employment 
cannot exist at the same time. Because judicial independence is 
constitutionally guaranteed, a potential infringement of such an important 
constitutional principle is worth investigating. 
3.2 Judicial independence in the context of employment 
3.2.1 The core of judicial independence 
Although there is no universally agreed definition of judicial independence,72 
it is accepted that the principle is based on two fundamental doctrines of 
constitutional governance.73 In the first instance, it stems from the doctrine 
of the separation of powers between the different branches of government, 
namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.74 Judicial 
                                            
70  Kleyn and Viljoen Beginner's Guide 62-63. 
71  This principle entails that a court is bound by the prior decisions of a higher court 
and by its own decisions in similar matters; see Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal 
System 214. 
72  Malleson 1997 MLR 657. 
73  Ajibola and Van Zyl Judiciary in Africa 107. 
74  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 123; 
Van Rooyen para 17; Carpenter 2005 TSAR 499-500. 
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independence is also derived from the supremacy of the rule of law,75 which 
is foundational to the Constitution.76 
Consensus also exists regarding the core of the principle. In broad terms it 
essentially entails that judicial officers should be independent from any 
influence, direction, control or any other form of interference when they 
perform their judicial functions, which is mainly to adjudicate.77 Accordingly, 
it is argued that should a judicial officer be categorised as an employee, the 
state as the employer would have control over the magistracy and thus be 
permitted to influence the outcome of decisions, which would result in 
judicial independence’s being compromised.78 An analysis of this argument 
follows below, with reference to the factor of supervision, in establishing who 
is an employee. 
3.2.2 Supervision and control, and judicial independence 
As stated above, the three main criteria to establish employment are 
supervision and control; the extent of the alleged employee’s integration in 
the organisation, and his or her economic dependence. It was concluded 
above that the position of magistrates would at least satisfy the latter two 
criteria. However, the first criterion, namely control and supervision, has 
been a contentious one.79 
The control or direction of the alleged employer is one of the listed factors 
to be taken into account for the presumption that a person is an employee 
to take effect.80 This factor raises the question whether control, in the 
context of employment, entails that the state will be entitled to direct or 
instruct a magistrate to reach a specific outcome in a case, for example, and 
thereby compromise the core of judicial independence. The Code of Good 
Practice provides the following explanation regarding the factor of 
supervision and control:81 
The factor of control or direction will generally be present if the applicant is 
required to obey the lawful and reasonable commands, orders or instructions 
of the employer or the employer's personnel (for example, managers or 
                                            
75  Van Rooyen para 17. 
76  Section 1(c) of the Constitution provides that the Republic of South Africa is founded 
on the values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. 
77  Ajibola and Van Zyl Judiciary in Africa 107; De Lange v Smuts 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) 
para 70; Van Rooyen para 19; also see Carpenter 2005 TSAR 500. 
78  Wallis 2012 SALJ 653-654; LDM Du Plessis; Khanyile. 
79  Wallis 2012 SALJ 653-654; LDM Du Plessis; Khanyile. 
80  As stated above under part 2.2.2, the same guidelines may be applied even to 
persons to whom the presumption does not apply, such as magistrates. 
81  Paragraph 18(a) of the Code of Good Practice. 
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supervisors) as to the manner in which they are to work. It is present in a 
relationship in which a person supplies only labour and the other party directs 
the manner in which he or she works ... It is an indication of an employment 
relationship that the 'employer' retains the right to choose which tools, staff, 
raw materials, routines, patents or technology are used. 
From the above explanation it is clear that supervision and control entail that 
the person alleging to be an employee is required to obey only the lawful 
and reasonable82 commands, orders or instructions of the "employer". 
Should magistrates be categorised as employees, there will be control over 
them in the sense that they are not entitled to set their own working hours 
and thus their own routines. They are also subject to a specific dress code 
at work, for example. They may also be subjected to performance appraisal 
and are furthermore provided with the tools necessary in order for them to 
be able to perform their functions, such as a cloak and chambers. 
It is submitted that the mere fact that control and direction may be present 
does not mean that the state or any other person will be authorised to 
demand or instruct a magistrate to act in breach of the constitutional duty of 
judicial independence. The Code of Good Practice clearly states that control 
and direction entail that the person will be required to obey only the lawful 
and reasonable demands of the employer. Also, in terms of the regulations 
under the Magistrates Act, a magistrate may be accused of misconduct only 
if he or she failed to execute a lawful order.83 The common law also requires 
an employee to carry out the lawful and reasonable instructions of the 
employer.84 The LRA furthermore protects employees in that they may not 
be prejudiced for a failure to do something that an employer may not lawfully 
permit an employee to do.85 If an employee is dismissed on the basis of 
refusing to carry out an unlawful instruction, such a dismissal will 
automatically be unfair.86 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that it would not be lawful and 
reasonable for the state to instruct a magistrate to reach a specific outcome 
in a case, for example. Such interference would be contrary to the 
                                            
82  Emphasis added. 
83  Regulation 25 contains general provisions regarding misconduct and in essence 
describes the circumstances in which a magistrate may be accused of misconduct. 
These include, but are not limited to, situations in which the magistrate is found guilty 
of an offence, contravenes a provision of the regulations, is negligent in the 
performance of his or her duties, and refuses to execute a lawful order. 
84  Van Niekerk et al Law@work 88. 
85  Section 5(2)(c)(iv) of the Act. 
86  Section 187(1) of the LRA provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the 
employer, in dismissing the employee, acts contrary to the provisions of s 5 of the 
Act. 
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Constitution, which expressly provides that the courts are independent. 
Therefore, in terms of the Constitution a magistrate would not be obliged to 
obey instructions from the state which would have the effect of breaching 
judicial independence. 
Should a magistrate indeed submit to such unlawful demands, judicial 
independence would be infringed by the individual magistrate and not by 
virtue of magistrate’s being an employee. The judiciary has been appointed 
as the guardian of judicial independence and should they be swayed to 
compromise the principle, the judiciary itself would be responsible for it.87 
Although the constitutional guarantee of an independent judiciary and the 
structures to protect courts and judicial officers against interference88 are 
aimed at protecting the judiciary from improper pressures, it cannot assure 
that they will indeed apply independence.89 The state of mind of the 
magistrate or his or her attitude in the actual exercise of judicial 
independence is referred to as individual independence.90 However, it is 
possible for magistrates to consider that if they go against what the state 
would expect them to do, they may jeopardise their promotion or may even 
be transferred.91 In this regard the Magistrates’ Commission could play an 
important role. The Commission was established in terms of the 
Magistrates’ Act to ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer of, 
discharge of, or disciplinary steps against, magistrates take place without 
favour or prejudice and to ensure that no victimisation takes place against 
magistrates.92 Although the Magistrates’ Act provides for conditions of 
service of magistrates, it does not mean that they cannot be regarded as 
employees. The mere fact that another statute regulates the conditions of 
their employment does not alter the nature and character of the employment 
relationship.93 
The fact that institutional independence is provided for by the Constitution 
does not mean that control and supervision in the context of employment 
may not be exercised over the magistracy. Therefore, in my view, 
                                            
87  Nugent 2000 Advocate 37-38. 
88  This notion is referred to as institutional independence. 
89  Clark Comparative Law and Society 195. 
90  See De Lange v Smuts 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) para 71, where the court quoted a 
passage from the Canadian case of Valente v The Queen 1986 24 DLR (4th) 161 
(SCC) 169-170, where a distinction was drawn between institutional and individual 
independence; also see Van Rooyen para 19. 
91  Van Dijkhorst 2000 Advocate 39. 
92  Section 4 of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993. 
93  Nkosi 2015 De Jure 238. See Reinecke para 13, where the Supreme Court of Appeal 
accepted that an employment relationship exists between a magistrate and the state. 
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independence and employment can be present at the same time and the 
two concepts are accordingly not mutually exclusive. 
As mentioned above, it may still be possible for an employment relationship 
to exist in terms of the criteria formulated in the SITA case, even though it 
may, for the sake of argument, be accepted that magistrates can never be 
under the supervision and control of the state.94 
3.2.3 Public confidence as an aspect of judicial independence 
It has been stated above that the essence of judicial independence is that 
judicial officers should be free from interference when they perform their 
duties. However, the concept has other dimensions too, and includes more 
than the idea that the judiciary should not be taking instructions from the 
government.95 Judicial independence and public confidence in the courts 
are interrelated values of justice. Other fundamental values include 
procedural fairness, efficiency and accessibility. The preservation of judicial 
independence is vital to ensuring the administration of justice by an efficient 
and reliable judiciary.96 
In the past, magistrates occasionally featured prominently in the news 
because of their conduct.97 The Magistrates’ Commission raised concern 
that the cases for misconduct against magistrates were not being timeously 
resolved. One of the cases before the Commission was of a magistrate who 
had been found guilty of murder and provisionally suspended in 2011, but 
years after the incident the magistrate's suspension had not yet been 
confirmed by Parliament.98 Another matter concerned the provisional 
suspension of a magistrate where the matter remained unresolved for 10 
years.99 
The delays in effectively resolving disputes regarding the suspension and 
removal of magistrates from office have given rise to delays in court 
proceedings, as magistrates on suspension cannot perform their judicial 
duties. Delays in the judicial process undermine judicial independence 
because they destroy the public's confidence in the judiciary.100 
                                            
94  SITA 803. 
95  Ajibola and Van Zyl Judiciary in Africa 172; Carpenter 2006 CILSA 364. 
96  Shetreet and Forsyth Culture of Judicial Independence 18, 41. 
97  Wagner 2014 http://bit.ly/1NkkrTY; Du Plessis Beeld. 
98  Hartley 2014 http://bit.ly/1YEDQ2J. 
99  Hartley 2014 http://bit.ly/1YEDQ2J. 
100  Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA) 260G-261H; 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo 2011 1 SACR 336 (SCA).  
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Furthermore, the public will lose confidence in the judiciary if it seems that 
appropriate action is not being taken against magistrates who misbehave. 
The loss of the public's confidence in the judiciary would hamper judicial 
independence. The delays in the judicial process and the resulting loss of 
confidence could be prevented if magistrates were afforded status as 
employees and labour legislation made applicable to them. The LRA 
provides for disciplinary processes and dispute resolution mechanisms 
which are aimed at ensuring that labour disputes are resolved efficiently and 
expeditiously.101 
This contribution, however, acknowledges the potential argument that the 
recognition of magistrates as employees of the state might create the public 
perception that magistrates are not independent and only an extension of 
government.102 This perception might hamper the public's confidence in the 
magistracy. 
However, historically magistrates formed part of the public service and in 
Reinecke the court remarked that magistrates were not completely removed 
from the public service.103 The court suggested that if the legislature had 
intended to remove them completely, the relevant legislation should have 
expressly stated so in clear language. This, the court stated, would have 
entailed the removal of the rights of magistrates, which they had as 
members of the public service, and the replacement thereof by other 
rights.104 
In this regard the court referred to section 18(3) of the Magistrates Act, 
which provides that "the conditions of service applicable [to magistrates] 
immediately prior to the commencement of section 12 shall not be affected 
to his or her detriment".105 This, the court held, indicates that magistrates 
are entitled to the same rights under the Magistrates Act as they were as 
members of the public service.106 
Therefore, the Magistrates Act did not extinguish the relationship between 
magistrates and the state in its entirety.107 Consequently, the classification 
of magistrates as employees would not mean that a new relationship with 
                                            
101  Benjamin 2009 ILJ 46. 
102  Franco and Powell 2004 SALJ 562. 
103  Reinecke paras 12-14. 
104  Reinecke para 12. 
105  Section 12 of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993 provides for the remuneration of 
magistrates.  
106  Reinecke para 12. 
107  Reinecke para 14. 
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the state would be created. A relationship already exists, and therefore an 
argument that the categorisation of magistrates as employees would create 
a public perception that the magistracy is not independent and merely an 
extension of the state could not hold. 
The rationale for excluding magistrates from protection in terms of labour 
law is said to be the protection of judicial independence. However, the 
current disciplinary regime applicable to magistrates in terms of the 
Magistrates Act gives rise to delays in disciplining magistrates.108 As stated 
above, these delays have the effect of jeopardising judicial independence 
by eroding public confidence. Public confidence and judicial independence 
would be protected if the disciplinary processes provided for by labour 
legislation were applicable to magistrates. It therefore seems that the 
exclusion of magistrates from employment status has the effect of 
jeopardising judicial independence. In the light of the above, it is submitted 
that relying on the need for judicial independence as a reason for excluding 
magistrates from protection in terms of labour law is in appropriate. 
4 Judicial independence and employment in England 
4.1 Introduction 
The uncertainty surrounding the employment status of magistrates in South 
Africa has been illustrated above, as well as the significance of a person’s 
holding employment status. It was said that the primary reason for the 
courts' reluctance to confer employment status on magistrates is the fact 
that the South African Constitution provides for the independence of the 
judiciary. However, an analysis of South African labour law principles has 
demonstrated that there is no necessary link between judicial independence 
and an employment relationship with the state. 
The following discussion sets out the position regarding the employment 
status of judicial officers in England and the extent to which they are 
protected in terms of labour law.109 The position is illustrated with reference 
                                            
108  The procedure for disciplining magistrates is lengthy and is set out under part five of 
the regulations in terms of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993. It broadly entails that an 
investigation must be conducted when there are allegations of misconduct against a 
magistrate. If the magistrate is found to be guilty of misconduct, the Minister may 
suspend or relieve the said magistrate from office. The suspension or removal of a 
magistrate must then be confirmed by Parliament in terms of s 13(4)(c) of the Act; 
also see fns 100-102 and the accompanying text. 
109  The English position is discussed with reference to judicial officers in general. In this 
regard no distinction is drawn between the different types of judicial officers, for 
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to a case in which the English Supreme Court had to decide whether a part-
time judge could be classified as a "worker" and was therefore entitled to 
pension benefits upon his retirement.110 
The purpose of a discussion of the English position is to illustrate the issue 
regarding the co-existence of employment and judicial independence. The 
discussion intends to demonstrate that South African magistrates could be 
protected by labour law without the principle of judicial independence being 
jeopardised. 
4.2 The case of O'Brien 
4.2.1  Facts 
The appellant, a part-time judge, claimed entitlement to a retirement 
pension from the then Department of Constitutional Affairs. However, his 
request was declined on the basis that the Judicial Pensions and Retirement 
Act of 1993 placed the position held by the appellant outside the scope of 
judicial officers for whom provision was made for a pension.111 A further 
reason advanced by the Department for declining the appellant's claim was 
that under European Law he was not a worker but an office-holder, and 
therefore not entitled to a pension.112 
The aggrieved appellant lodged a discrimination claim in the Employment 
Tribunal against the Department on the basis that he was being 
discriminated against because he had been a part-time worker. The 
Employment Tribunal ruled in favour of the appellant, but on appeal to the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal his claim was rejected because of a 
procedural issue, namely that he had failed to bring the initial claim within 
the prescribed time limitations. Nevertheless, it was consented that the 
Court of Appeal would adjudicate the case on both the procedural and 
substantive issues on a test basis.113 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appellant's appeal regarding the time 
limitations, but on the issue of substance rejected the Employment 
                                            
example between judges and magistrates. The South African Act deals only with the 
position of magistrates. 
110  O'Brien v Ministry of Justice (formerly the Department of Constitutional Affairs) 2013 
UKSC 6 (hereafter O'Brien). 
111  Section 1 of the Act sets out the categories of persons who qualify for a pension 
under the Act. 
112  O'Brien para 5. 
113  O'Brien para 6. 
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Tribunal's finding and in effect the appellant's claim, on the basis that judges 
are not workers.114 
4.2.2 Issues before the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU") 
In 2010 the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, which in turn referred 
two questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.115 
The first issue for consideration by the CJEU was whether or not national 
law should determine whether judges are workers as contemplated in 
clause 2 of the Framework Agreement.116 In this regard the CJEU ruled that 
it is for member states to determine whether judges fall within the category 
of workers.117 It was noted that an exclusion from the protection provided by 
the relevant Directives would be permitted only if the relationship between 
judges and the Ministry of Justice was substantially different from that 
between employers and employees.118 
This ruling seems to be consistent with the approach taken by South African 
courts, namely that protection in terms of labour law should be determined 
with reference to an employment relationship as opposed to the existence 
of a contract of employment.119 However, as stated earlier, even though the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Reinecke accepted that an 
employment relationship existed between the aggrieved magistrate and the 
Department of Justice, the court was not prepared to extend protection in 
terms of labour legislation to the magistrate.120 
The second question for consideration before the CJEU was that if it is 
established that judges are indeed workers, was it permissible for national 
law to draw distinctions between different kinds of judges in relation to the 
provision of pension. With regards to this issue it was ruled that national law 
                                            
114  O'Brien para 7. 
115  O'Brien v Ministry of Justice C-393/10. Article 267 of the Treaty for the Functioning 
of the European Union (2007) provides that the CJEU shall have jurisdiction to make 
preliminary rulings regarding questions on the interpretation of treaties and the 
validity and interpretation of statutes.  
116  This issue is referred to as the "worker" issue. Clause 2.1 of the Framework 
Agreement under the European Union Directive on Part-time Work (1997) provides 
that the agreement applies to part-time workers engaged in an employment contract 
or an employment relationship. 
117  O'Brien para 32. 
118  O'Brien para 42. 
119  Van Niekerk et al Law@work 59. 
120  Reinecke para 13. 
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should not draw a distinction between different types of judges unless 
objective reasons existed for doing so.121 
The discussion below focusses primarily on the issue of whether or not 
judicial officers are workers and thus entitled to labour law protection (the 
worker issue). 
4.2.3 Judgment on the worker issue 
The CJEU stated that the decision to determine whether judges are workers 
was to be made by the Supreme Court.122 However, the CJEU laid down 
certain guidelines to be considered by the Supreme Court in order to 
establish whether the relationship between part-time judges and the Ministry 
of Justice was substantially different from the relationship between 
employers and employees.123 The following factors and criteria were to be 
considered: 
(a) the difference between judges and self-employed persons; 
(b) the rules relating to the appointment and removal of judges as well 
as their working hours; and 
(c) judges' entitlement to sick, maternity and paternity pay as well as 
other benefits.124 
The CJEU also confirmed that the fact that judges were judicial office-
holders did not preclude them from the protection afforded by the 
Framework Agreement.125 The Supreme Court was obliged to determine 
the issues before it in accordance with the above guidelines and laid down 
by the CJEU.126 
In evaluating the relationship between judges and the Ministry of Justice in 
accordance with the principles laid down by the CJEU, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the appellant had been engaged in an employment 
relationship as contemplated in clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement 
and accordingly had to be treated as a worker.127 
                                            
121  O'Brien para 67. 
122  O'Brien para 43. 
123  O'Brien para 43. 
124  O'Brien paras 44-46. 
125  O'Brien para 41; also see Holland, Burnett and Millington Employment Law 30. 
126  Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act, 1972. 
127  O'Brien para 42. 
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It was also held that the work performed by judges differed from the work 
done by self-employed persons. Judges were furthermore obliged to work 
within set times and were entitled to various benefits.128 
The court adopted the guidance of the CJEU regarding the issue of 
employment and judicial independence and confirmed that the status of 
judges as workers would not impede their judicial independence.129 In this 
regard the court referred to the view of the CJEU that an entitlement to a 
pension strengthened the economic independence of judges rather than 
jeopardising the core of judicial independence.130 It was accordingly 
concluded that judicial independence was not an appropriate justification for 
the exclusion of judicial officers from the protection afforded by the 
Framework Agreement.131 
In the light of the above, the appellant judge's appeal was upheld and his 
entitlement to pension benefits confirmed. The order of the Court of Appeal 
was accordingly set aside.132 
Should one apply the factors laid down by the CJEU to the position of 
magistrates in South Africa, one would not be able to arrive at a conclusion 
other than that the relationship between magistrates and the Department of 
Justice is substantially no different from the relationship between an 
employer and employee. As noted above, magistrates are obliged to work 
within defined periods of time and their work differs from that of self-
employed persons. 
The confirmation by the English courts that the judicial independence of 
judicial officers does not preclude them from the protection and benefits 
afforded by labour law illustrates the view that judicial independence and 
employment are not mutually exclusive concepts. 
5 Conclusion 
It is important for parties to know whether or not their relationship is one of 
employment. This is so because an employment relationship creates rights, 
remedies and duties for the parties. Over the years the courts have 
                                            
128  O'Brien para 30. 
129  O'Brien para 30. 
130  O'Brien para 34. 
131  O'Brien para 34; also see Shetreet and Turenne Judges on Trial 175, where the 
authors accept the view in O'Brien that judicial independence is not a valid 
justification for excluding members of the judiciary from an entitlement to labour law 
protection. 
132  O'Brien para 76. 
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developed different tests to establish whether a contract of employment 
existed between the parties. These tests have been incorporated into 
legislation and remain relevant in the enquiry as to who is an employee. As 
stated above, the courts have adopted an approach to establish an 
employment relationship rather than the existence of a contract of 
employment.133 A similar approach was adopted by the legislature with the 
introduction of a broadened definition of dismissal to provide protection 
against unfair dismissal to those who are not necessarily engaged in a valid 
contract of employment.134 The shift in focus to an employment relationship 
instead of a contract of employment affirms the inclusive approach of the 
courts in respect of protection in terms of labour law. 
In the case of Reinecke, the Supreme Court of Appeal was prepared to 
accept that an employment relationship existed between the state and the 
aggrieved magistrate.135 The court in Khanyile also acknowledged that a 
magistrate could qualify as an employee in terms of the statutory definition 
of an employee.136 However, the court was not prepared to make the 
protection of labour law available to the aggrieved magistrate in view of the 
constitutional guarantee of judicial independence. 
The inclusion of magistrates under the LRA will not necessarily result in the 
undermining of judicial independence. Instances exist where the executive 
is involved in the administration of justice.137 The judiciary cannot operate 
as an island and it has certain connections with the executive, relating to 
issues such as funding, for example.138 The challenge is to have in place 
proper protection against influences that may interfere with the judiciary's 
independence in performing its duties.139 In this regard the Constitution 
provides for institutional independence and the Magistrates Act could also 
be useful in ensuring that magistrates comply with the requirements of 
judicial independence. 
Furthermore, if it was intended that labour legislation should not apply to 
magistrates, they should have been excluded from the application of labour 
                                            
133  Van Niekerk et al Law@work 59; Kylie paras 39, 40 and 54; Discovery Health v 
CCMA 2008 29 ILJ 1480 (LC) paras 49 and 54; Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 
of 2014; s 186(1) of the LRA. 
134  Section 186(1) and 186(1)(a) of the LRA; Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 
2014. 
135  Reinecke para 13. Also see Nkosi 2015 De Jure 238. 
136  Khanyile para 10. Also see ss 2 and 213 of the LRA; Khanyile para 10. 
137  Shetreet and Forsyth Culture of Judicial Independence 25.  
138  Hatchard and Slinn Parliamentary Supremacy 76-77 
139  Russell and O'Brien Judicial Independence 21. 
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law in express terms.140 Labour legislation failed to do so, and it is therefore 
submitted that it was not intended for magistrates not to have recourse in 
terms of labour legislation. Even if the legislation had such intention, the 
Constitution affords the right to fair labour practices to "everyone", including 
magistrates.141 
If the trend of a more inclusive labour regime as applied by South African 
courts were to be adopted consistently, there would be no need for 
magistrates to be excluded from the protection afforded by labour law. In 
this regard South Africa can learn lessons from the English position, that a 
person may have status as an employee without judicial independence 
being compromised. On the contrary, benefit and protection in terms of 
labour law can strengthen judicial independence.  
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